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Abstract. We study a credit risk model which captures effects of economic inter-
actions on a firm’s default probability. Economic interactions are represented as a
functionally defined graph, and the existence of both cooperative, and competitive,
business relations is taken into account. We provide an analytic solution of the model
in a limit where the number of business relations of each company is large, but the
overall fraction of the economy with which a given company interacts may be small.
While the effects of economic interactions are relatively weak in typical (most proba-
ble) scenarios, they are pronounced in situations of economic stress, and thus lead to
a substantial fattening of the tails of loss distributions in large loan portfolios. This
manifests itself in a pronounced enhancement of the Value at Risk computed for inter-
acting economies in comparison with their non-interacting counterparts.
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1. Introduction
The proper quantification of credit risk poses a complex mix of problems, as important
credit risk parameters such as default rates, recovery rates or exposures, fluctuate
substantially in time even on a high portfolio aggregation level [1]. This results in
large unexpected losses in loan portfolios, for which banks are required to hold equity
capital as a loss buffer. To determine the appropriate level of equity capital for banks’
loan portfolios is one main focus of the regulatory consultive process known as Basel
II [2]. Accordingly, credit risk modelling has been a focus of intense research in recent
years [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21], although considering
the risk premium when pricing interest rates goes back some time [22].
The assessment of credit ratings by assessment agencies such as Moody’s and
S&P allow some statistical assessment of the credit quality of individual offerings or
particular companies. However, it is clearly essential when considering the risk of a
basket of loans that the correlations between the members of the portfolio are taken
into account. One systematic approach is to replace the number of firms in a portfolio
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with an effective number of independent firms [24]. By boosting the contribution of
each firm to keep the mean loss constant, this introduces a larger variance of losses,
in at attempt to capture the risk caused by correlations between firms. JPMorgan’s
CreditMetrics approach [3] (see also Credit Suisse Financial Products’s CreditRisk+ [4]
and [19] for a detailed comparison of the two) tries to model the correlations between
firms in credit quality using the observable correlations in equity value of the firms.
An intuitively appealing approach is to assume that the default intensity depends on
some set of macroscopic economic factors (e.g. interest rates, growth rates, oil prices
etc.), the so-called reduced form model [7, 8]. Thus the default rates of different firms
are coupled via some limited number of factors, but given the factors the default rates
are independent. In structural models [22, 23], the dependence on macro-economic
factors is understood in terms of correlations in the dynamics of asset returns of
different companies, leading to correlations in default rates via correlated dynamics
of returns. More involved approaches have modelled interactions between firms in the
wider economy by introducing changes to a firm’s default intensity upon the default of
another firm [6], or via a copula function [10]. The quantification of these correlations
via simulations is discussed in [14].
The main purpose of the present contribution is specifically to expand upon
recent modelling and analytic descriptions of the influence of counter-party risk
[6, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21]. Counter-party risk addresses the fact that a given
firm’s economic health is strongly influenced by the performance within the network of
companies with which it has direct economic interactions. Economic interactions are
here to be read in a broad sense as any form of relation which is likely to mutually
influence performance, though not necessarily in symmetric ways. Specifically, a
defaulting firm within this network of counter-parties will affect a company’s own default
probability — reducing it, if the defaulting firm was a competitor, or increasing it, if
the relation was of a cooperative nature. When the default probability is increased, this
process is known as credit contagion and has been considered in e.g. [16, 18] while the
incorporation of counter-party risk into a reduced form model was introduced in [9]. In
what follows we consider the dynamics of individual firm defaults and their influence on
loss distributions. More subtle effects such as credit quality migration are, as yet, not
taken into account.
The importance of direct functional interactions in the analysis of risk is not
restricted to credit risk. In fact the role of interactions is much more obvious in the
context of operational risk, where sequential, functionally induced failures of mutually
dependent processes constitute one of the main sources for operational risk. Indeed, an
attempt to explore the consequences of interactions for quantifying the capital buffer
necessary to cover operational risk [25] has provided major ingredients for the approach
to credit risk modelling started by Neu and one of us [21].
In the present paper we provide an analytic solution to the dynamical description
of counter-party risk within a heterogeneous, functionally defined network of interacting
firms (to be referred to as economy in what follows), see e.g. [18], in the spirit of [21].
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We generalize the analysis of that study to capture effects of cooperative as well as
competitive business relations within the economy, and we solve the model for a wide
degree of dilution of the network of economic dependencies in the sense that we assume
each company in the net to have business relations only with a (randomly chosen) subset
of the full set of companies. In the present investigation we will always consider the case
where the number of interaction partners of each company is large, and for simplicity we
shall restrict ourselves here to the case where the graph defining economic connectivity is
a Poisson degree distributed Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graph [26]. More realistic connectivity
distributions reflecting the different connectivity patterns of large and small players in
an economy, taking into account small-world effects and fat tailed degree distributions
[27] can be handled by methods similar to those used in the present investigation [28, 29],
but will be studied in a separate paper.
As in [21], the model parameters are unconditional and conditional default
probabilities, which may be thought of as being obtained via a suitable rating procedure.
One of the virtues of the present analytic investigation is to highlight the fact that the
collective behaviour of the system, which ultimately determines the the loss-distribution
on an economy-wide scale, is fairly insensitive to detail. That is, it does not depend on
getting individual dependencies correct, but only on the overall distribution of of the
unconditional and conditional default probabilities. Our main result is to demonstrate
that the effects of economic interactions — while relatively weak in typical scenarios —
are pronounced in situations of economic stress, and thus lead to a substantial fattening
of the tails of loss distributions even in large loan portfolios.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we define our model,
and specify the stochastic setting for our analytic investigation. The relation between
the model parameters and conditional and unconditional default probabilities as used
in [21] is briefly reviewed to make the paper self-contained. Sec. 3 describes a heuristic
solution for the dynamical evolution of the fraction of defaulted companies over a risk
horizon of one year, starting from an overall healthy situation, a scenario appropriate for
the analysis of credit risk. A formal solution in terms of a generating function approach
(GFA) [30], which provides a full justification for the heuristic solution is relegated
to Appendix A. Both solution methods are based upon techniques developed in the
statistical mechanical analysis of dilute neural networks [31]. In Sec. 4 a phase diagram
distinguishing regions in parameter space in which economic interactions can lead to a
collective acceleration of the economy-wide default rate in situations of economic stress
from regions where such acceleration is impossible is computed. Distributions of annual
fractions of defaulted companies as well as loss distributions, both economy-wide and for
finite loan-portfolios are also computed and compared with simulations. Sec. 5 finally
summarizes our findings and discusses their main implications for the analysis of credit
risk
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2. Model Definitions
In this section we define a statistical model that attempts to capture the effects
of counter-party risk on credit contagion. In contrast to approaches based on
microeconomics, and in keeping with the framework discussed in the introduction, we
allow the firms’ wealth, macro-economic factors and interactions between firms to all
be described probabilistically. This is due to our focus on the characteristic change in
behaviour caused by examining interactions between firms in the wider economy.
We analyse an economy which consists of N firms. The state of each firm i at a
given time t is described by its ‘wealth’ Wit which we take to be the difference between
its assets and its liabilities. Accordingly, a company defaults, if its wealth Wit falls
below zero. As indicated in the introduction, we are interested in the influence of
economic partners on firms’ own performance, specifically on their default probability.
We understand the notions of firm and economic partner in a very wide sense: a firm
could be any economic entity, a manufacturer, a service provider, a trader of goods or
services, etc. It could also be an individual (we shall often use the generic term ‘node’
to designate these entities). Two firms are partners if the state of one has a material
effect upon the other, e.g. one is the supplier of the other, performs outsourced services,
there exists substantial loans or other financial commitments between the two, or they
compete in the same market. For instance, if a major manufacturer of PCs were to go
out of business tomorrow, this would inevitably have a material impact on the economic
performance (i.e. wealth) of other companies operating in the same industry sector.
It would on the one hand lead to a deterioration in the financial viability of most of
the suppliers or service providers of the PC manufacturer in question — including in
particular its own work force! — but on the other hand it would improve the situation
for competing producers of PCs, in that they could profit by taking over a share of the
defaulted company’s market.
We are interested in quantifying the effect of these interactions from the perspective
of a lending bank which would be required to set aside a sufficient amount of capital
to cover losses incurred by defaults of its obligors. Another perspective might be that
of a central bank, which would base monetary policy decisions in part on their impact
on expected default rates at an economy wide scale. The typical risk horizon in these
contexts would be one year.
For simplicity, we assume that that within the risk horizon of one year node
i experiences an interaction-induced material change of its wealth only if one of its
business partners, say j, defaults. In order to formalize this in a dynamical description,
we introduce binary indicator variable njt which indicates whether node j is solvent at
time t (njt = 0) or has defaulted (njt = 1).
The value of the ith node’s wealth at time t, Wit, is thus taken to be of the form
Wit = ϑi −
n∑
j=1
Jijnjt − ηit (1)
Here Jij denotes the change in i’s wealth which would be induced by a default of node
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j. One would have Jij > 0 if j is a cooperative partner of i, whereas Jij < 0 if j is a
competitor, while Jij = 0 if there is no direct influence of j on i. By ϑi we designate i’s
initial wealth at the beginning of the year, and ηit are random fluctuations caused by
both, external macro-economic factors (an expanding/shrinking economy, an oil price
spike, market sentiment etc), and firm specific actions or events.
We take the initial state of the economy to be a set of solvent firms, ni0 = 0 for all
i, (one could view this as a definition) and say that a firm defaults at time t if Wit < 0.
We define our dynamics such that if a firm goes bankrupt it does not recover within a
risk horizon of one year, so the bankrupt state is absorbing. Thus the dynamics of the
firms state is given by the equation
nit+1 = nit + (1− nit)Θ
(∑
j
Jijnjt − ϑi + ηit
)
(2)
where Θ(. . .) is the Heavyside function. The time step in this dynamical rule will be
taken to represent one month.
We choose the ηit to be Gaussian distributed. Without loss of generality they can
— by suitably rescaling the ϑi and the Jij — be chosen to have unit variance. We follow
widespread practice [3, 5] to account for common fluctuating macro-economic factors
by choosing the ηit to be correlated for different i. This could be achieved by taking ηit
to be of the form
ηit = σiξit +
K∑
k=1
βikYkt (3)
with uncorrelated Gaussian unit variance white noises ξit and {Ykt}, the former
describing firm specific wealth fluctuations, whereas the latter could account for the
relative effects of fluctuations common to industry sectors, regions, or countries, with
prefactors σi and βik describing the relative importance of these fluctuations on i. In
what follows we restrict ourselves to a minimal variant of this set-up by finally choosing
ηit =
√
ρ η0t +
√
1− ρ ξit . (4)
We shall simplify matters further by assuming that the common economic factor η0t is
slow and take it to be constant η0t = η0 within a risk horizon of one year. One-factor
models of this type also feature in the regulatory framework laid out in the Basel II
accord [2].
None of the simplifying assumptions are necessary for our analysis to go through;
the generating function formalism given in Appendix A in particular can easily handle
more general cases. However, the simplified setting is sufficient to highlight the
important effects of interactions on credit risk, and it does lead to a greatly simplified
macroscopic description of the system, as we will see in Sec. 3.
As for the Jij which describe the loss or gain of node i due to a default of node j,
in the present paper we will investigate them in a probabilistic setting. It will be useful
to disentangle the presence or absence of an interaction from its strength by writing
Jij = cij J˜ij (5)
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where cij ∈ {0, 1} describes the absence or presence of a connection j → i, while J˜ij
describes its magnitude, both of which are assumed to be fixed. It is reasonable to
assume that connectivity is a symmetric relation, cij = cji, whereas there is no reason
to suppose symmetry of the magnitudes of mutual influences. Considering the case of
a small supplier with one large company taking the majority of its orders, if the larger
company defaults then the small supplier may well go bust too. However, if the small
supplier defaults then the large company is less likely to suffer terminal financial distress,
so in general J˜ij 6= J˜ji.
Specifically, we assume a random connectivity pattern described by
P (cij) =
c
N
δcij ,1 +
(
1− c
N
)
δcij ,0 , i < j , cij = cji (6)
and we will be interested in the limit of a large economy (the thermodynamic limit), in
which the average connectivity c of each node is itself large, N →∞, c →∞. We will
initially be concerned with the extremely diluted regime, where c/N → 0, taking e.g.
c = O(log(N)). These assumptions have important consequences for the structure of
the graph defining the connectivities, namely that each node feels the effects of a large
number of other nodes (so that limit theorems will allow us to describe the overall effects
of interactions) and, for the extremely diluted regime, that there are only a finite number
of loops of finite length even in the infinite economy limit. The graph of interactions
between companies for finite N is just an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graph [26].
The magnitudes J˜ij of the interactions will also be taken as fixed random quantities.
In order to allow the taking of the thermodynamic limit as described, the mean and
fluctuations of the J˜ij must scale in a suitable way with the connectivity c. Quite
generally, we must have
J˜ij =
J0
c
+
J√
c
xij (7)
in which the xij are zero-mean unit-variance random variables. The scaling of mean
and variance of the J˜ij is given by the parameters J0 and J respectively. If J0 > 0 there
will be a net cooperative tendency within the economy, which seems to be a reasonable
assumption. Finally, we will need to assume that all moments of the xij are finite and
we will choose the xij to be independent in pairs
xij = 0 , x
2
ij = 1 , xijxji = α , xijxkl = 0 otherwise . (8)
The parameter α, (−1 ≤ α ≤ 1) describes the degree of correlations between Jij and
Jji. Strictly symmetric interactions are obtained only for α = 1
At this point let us briefly recall that, after rescaling as described, the model
parameters ϑi and Jij have a clear meaning in terms of unconditional and conditional
default probabilities [21]. We denote by nt the values of all indicator variables in the
economy at time t, assuming nit = 0. Then by integrating over the unit variance
Gaussian ηit in (2) one obtains the conditional probability for node i to default within
a month given a configuration nt of non-defaulted and defaulted firms in the economy
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at time t as,
Prob
(
nit+1 = 1
∣∣∣nt) = Φ(∑
j
Jij njt − ϑi
)
with Φ(x) = 1
2
[1 + erf(x/
√
2)] the cumulative normal distribution. Thus the
unconditional probability pi of default of i within a month in an otherwise healthy
economy and the conditional probability pi|j for a default of i within a month, given j
and only j has defaulted before are given by
pi = Prob
(
nit+1 = 1
∣∣∣ {nit = 0}) = Φ(−ϑi) , (9)
pi|j = Prob
(
nit+1 = 1
∣∣∣njt = 1, {nk(6=j)t = 0}) = Φ(Jij − ϑi) . (10)
These relations may be inverted to express the model parameters in terms of conditional
and unconditional default probabilities — quantities that would be estimated in a rating
procedure — as
ϑi = −Φ−1(pi) , Jij = Φ−1(pi|j)− Φ−1(pi) . (11)
While characterising the default of companies is of interest, our primary concern
is to examine the distribution of losses accrued over our one year time frame, both in
the economy at large, and in a portfolio made up of a finite number of firms within the
economy. We assume that the losses caused by default are independent of the month of
default, and then examine two different cases. The first simpler case is that the losses at
firm i, given that firm i defaults, are uncorrelated with any other variables. The second,
perhaps more interesting case, is that the losses at firm i are random but are correlated
with the initial monetary reserves ϑi. The intuitive reasons are that if a firm has more
cash, then the default is less anticipated, and thus will be less priced in by the market;
or the firm has larger credit lines and so will default on a larger amount; and finally the
firm is likely to be larger, and hence cause a larger loss.
3. Heuristic Solution
In the present section we show that our model has a relatively simple solution that can be
obtained by qualitative probabilistic reasoning, appealing to statistical limit theorems.
This solution turns out to be exact, as we show using a more involved generating function
formalism in Appendix A. Both types of argument have been developed in the analysis
of the statistical mechanics of disordered systems, and in particular neural network
models [31], while for a more general introduction to emergent collective behaviour see
e.g. [32]. Recall the microscopic dynamics as defined by (2). The complications are
due to the interactions between firms, namely that the state of a given firm i at time t,
depends on the state of the neighbours of i for times t′ < t which in turn depend on i at
times t′′ < t′ < t. In general this feedback prohibits straightforward analysis, and indeed,
it led Jarrow and Yu [9] to eliminate this feedback explicitly by considering an economy
of two types of firms: primary firms whose default depended only on macro-economic
factors and secondary firms whose default depended on macro-economic factors and the
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default of primary firms. However, due to the specific structure of our model we are
able to push the analysis further. By definition, the overall effect of interaction terms
on company i at time t is given by the local field hit =
∑
j Jijnjt. From the statistics of
the interactions Jij given by (6)-(8) we see that each firm i is connected to, on average,
c other firms. Since we consider the large c limit, this means that we could evaluate the
statistics of hit by appeal to the law of large numbers and the central limit theorem if
the contributions to hit were independent, or at least sufficiently weakly correlated.
At first sight we cannot expect this condition to hold if we have some degree of
symmetry in the interactions, i.e. for α 6= 0, even in the extremely diluted regime. Note
that there are two ways in which the njt of the neighbours interacting with i may become
correlated through the dynamics: either they influence each other through firm i, or not
through firm i but though some loop of interactions in the economy. In the extremely
diluted regime, correlations between the neighbours j of i cannot build up in finite time
(within the risk horizon) via loops not involving i, since due to the scaling almost all
loops are very long. With symmetry in the interactions, correlations between the njt
could in principle be induced by the dynamics of i. However, as long as nit = 0, the
njt clearly cannot influence each other through site i, whereas once nit = 1, then firm i
is in the absorbing state, and correlations it induces on the dynamics of its neighbours,
have become irrelevant for its own microscopic dynamics (2). Thus limit theorems can
be used after all to solve the macroscopic dynamics of the system, despite a possible
symmetry in the interactions.
Returning to the dynamical evolution equation (2), we observe that the coupling
of a node to the economy is via the local field
hit =
∑
j
Jijnjt =
J0
c
∑
j
cijnjt +
J√
c
∑
j
cijxijnjt , (12)
which is a sum of random quantities (with randomness both due to the Gaussian
fluctuating forces (the {ηit}, respectively the {ξit}), and due to the heterogeneity of
the environment). The first contribution is a sum of terms of non-vanishing average.
By the law of large numbers this sum converges to the sum of averages in the large c
limit,
h0it ≡
J0
c
∑
j
cijnjt → J0
c
∑
j
cij〈njt〉 ≃ J0
c
∑
j
cij 〈njt〉 = J0 1
N
∑
j
〈njt〉
in which angled brackets 〈. . .〉 denote an average over the fluctuating forces, and the
overbar (. . .) an average over the Jij, i.e., the cij and the xij . An approximation is
made by assuming negligible correlations between the cij and the 〈njt〉 induced by the
heterogeneity of the interactions. The second contribution to (12) is a sum of random
variables with zero mean, which we have argued are sufficiently weakly correlated for
the central limit theorem to apply for describing the statistics of their sum. Thus the
sum
δhit ≡ J√
c
∑
j
cijxijnjt
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is a zero-mean Gaussian whose variance follows from
〈(δhit)2〉 = J
2
c
∑
jk
cijcikxijxik〈njtnkt〉 ≃ J
2
c
∑
jk
cijcikxijxik〈njtnkt〉
= J2
1
N
∑
j
〈njt〉
An approximation based on assuming negligible correlations has been made as for the
first contributions. Thus the local field hit is a Gaussian with mean h
0
it and variance
〈(δhit)2〉 both scaling with the average fraction of defaulted nodes in the economy. By the
law of large numbers this average fraction will be typically realized in a large economy,
i.e. we have
mt =
1
N
∑
j
njt → 1
N
∑
j
〈njt〉 (13)
in the large N limit. The dynamics of the fraction of defaulted nodes then follows from
(2),
mt+1 =
1
N
∑
i
nit+1 = mt +
1
N
∑
i
(1− nit)Θ
(
hit − ϑi +√ρη0 +
√
1− ρ ξit
)
, (14)
where the one factor noise model (4) has been used.
The sum in (14) is evaluated as a sum of averages over joint nit, hit, and ξit
distribution by the law of large numbers. We exploit the fact that nit, ξit and hit
are uncorrelated. Noting that the sum hit+
√
1− ρ ξit is Gaussian with mean J0mt and
variance 1− ρ+ J2mt, and taking into account that nit-averages, depend on i through
ϑi, 〈nit〉 = 〈nt〉(ϑi), we find
mt+1 = mt +
1
N
∑
i
1− 〈nt〉(ϑi)
2

1 + erf

J0mt +√ρ η0 − ϑi√
2(1− ρ+ J2mt)




This version can be understood as an average over the ϑ distribution
p(ϑ) =
1
N
∑
i
δ(ϑ− ϑi) ,
which maps onto a distribution of unconditional default probabilities as discussed above.
Denoting that average by 〈. . .〉ϑ we finally get the following evolution equation for the
macroscopic fraction of defaulted companies in the economy
mt+1 = mt +
〈
1− 〈nt〉(ϑ)
2

1 + erf

J0mt +√ρ η0 − ϑ√
2(1− ρ+ J2mt)



〉
ϑ
(15)
We have thus an explicit dynamic equation for the macroscopic fraction of defaulted
nodes in the economy. It involves first propagating ϑ-dependent default probabilities
via
〈nt+1〉(ϑ) = 〈nt〉(ϑ) + 1− 〈nt〉(ϑ)
2

1 + erf

J0mt +√ρ η0 − ϑ√
2(1− ρ+ J2mt)



 , (16)
Effects of Economic Interactions on Credit Risk 10
which depends only on mt, thereafter performing an integral over the ϑ distribution to
obtain the updated fraction mt+1 of defaulted nodes given in (15).
The heuristic solution of the macroscopic dynamics (15), (16) presented here is
based on independence assumptions which are not easily justified in a rigorous way via
the probabilistic reasoning presented above. However, the solution is supported in full
detail by an exact analysis based on generating functions presented in Appendix A.
4. Results
In the present section we explore the consequences of our theory. We studied the
dynamics and computed loss distributions for an economy in which the parameters ϑi
determining unconditional monthly default probabilities according to (9) are normally
distributed with mean ϑ0 = 3, and variance σ
2
ϑ = 0.01 so that typical monthly
default probabilities are in the 5 ×10−4 range. Except when stated otherwise we shall
use ρ = 0.15 for the parameter describing the relative importance of economy-wide
fluctuations, a value that is considered to be in an economically acceptable range.
In Fig 1a we show the evolution of the typical fraction of defaulted firms over a
risk horizon of 12 months for various settings of the interaction parameters J0 and J ;
the typical fraction is computed by choosing the most-probable value η0 = 0 for the
economy-wide influence on the dynamics. Fig 1b shows the probability density of the
end of year fraction of defaulted firms driven by fluctuations in economic conditions. It
is obvious that interactions cause a significant fattening of the tail of the density at large
values of this fraction, which is a clear indication of the significance of counter-party
risk in particular in situations of economic stress.
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Figure 1. Left: Typical fraction of defaulted companies as a function of time for
(J0, J) = (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), and (1,1) (bottom to top). Right: Distribution of the
fraction of defaulted companies at t = 12 for (J0, J) = (0, 0), and (1,1). Analytic
curves are overlaid with results of a simulation in which the distribution is obtained
by computing the fraction of defaulted companies for randomly sampled η0.
In order to assess whether interactions can lead to a collective acceleration of the
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rate of defaults we look at the discrete second derivatives
∆t = mt+1 +mt−1 − 2mt
which are always negative for the non-interacting system and maximal at t = 1,
irrespectively of η0. Interactions can lead to a collective acceleration of the rate of
defaults signified by the possibility that the ∆t may become positive in unfavourable
economic conditions. We define the region in parameter space in which collective
acceleration of default rates can occur by the condition that
Prob
{
∆t > 0
}
> 0 (17)
for some t, with 1 < t < 11. The concavity of the error function for positive arguments
entails that effects of collective acceleration are always strongest at t = 1. Evaluating
this condition for various values of the parameter ρ describing the coupling to the overall
economy, we get lines shown in the phase diagram Fig 2a. Note that the influence of ρ
is very weak in interesting region of low ρ values. Note also that ∆1 values are typically
positive but very small in the region near the phase boundaries shown, as illustrated in
In Fig 2b where we exhibit the distribution of discrete second derivatives at t = 1, just
inside the phase where acceleration of default rates is observed. The tail of negative ∆1
is found to extend to significantly larger values.
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Figure 2. Left: Phase boundaries separating regions without collective acceleration of
default rates from regions where acceleration occurs, for ρ = 0.15, 0.3 and 0.8 (bottom
to top). Distribution of discrete second derivative ∆1 = m2 +m0 − 2m1 just within
the phase with accelerating default rates for (J0, J) = (0.5, 0.5) (right).
The quantity of central importance from the point of view of credit risk analysis is
of course the distribution of losses. Let ℓi denote the loss that would be incurred by a
default of node i. Then the loss per node for a given state η0 of the economy is
L(η0) =
1
N
∑
i
ni12ℓi (18)
where ℓi is randomly sampled from the loss distribution for node i. We assume that
the ℓi are independent of the stochastic evolution. In the large system limit, the loss
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per node at given value of η0 describing the influence of the overall economy is a non-
fluctuating quantity, as it is itself an (empirical) average taken over an (infinitely) large
system,
L(η0) = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
n12(ϑi)ℓ(ϑi) =
∫
dϑp(ϑ)〈n12〉(ϑ)ℓ(ϑ) (19)
by the law of large numbers, where ℓ = ℓ(ϑ) is the mean of the loss distribution for
a node. If loss distributions were identical for each node, with means independent of
default probabilities ℓ(ϑ) = ℓ0, then the distribution of losses driven by the fluctuations
of the economic stresses would simply replicate the distribution of the fraction of
defaulted firms.
The situation is different if loss-distributions are correlated with default
probabilities. As an example we consider the case where average losses are inversely
proportional to the unconditional default probabilities pd(ϑi) = pi introduced in (9).
ℓ(ϑ) =
ℓ0
ε+ pd(ϑ)
(20)
with a parameter ε introduced as a regularizer to prevent divergence as pd →
0. That is, the contribution to the total losses incurred by defaulting firms with
different unconditional default probabilities is approximately uniform over the default
probabilities. In our model we have
pd(ϑ) =
1
2
[1− erf(ϑ/
√
2)] (21)
Fig. 3 shows loss distributions for such a situation. The analytic curves are computed
by noting that the losses per node are monotone increasing functions of η0 which is itself
N (0, 1). Integrated loss distributions are thus simply obtained using error functions
Prob[L(η0) ≤ L] = 1
2
[1 + erf(η0(L)/
√
2)]
where η0(L) is the η0-value giving rise to loss L per node. The probability density
function is obtained via a single numerical differentiation.
It would be of some interest to know whether finite sample fluctuations could
possibly upset the picture seen so far. To study this issue we look at the losses per
node of a finite sample randomly drawn from the nodes of a large economy,
LM(η0) =
1
M
M∑
i=1
n12(ϑi)ℓ(ϑi) (22)
Writing this as
LM(η0) =
1
M
M∑
i=1
〈
〈n12〉(ϑ)ℓ(ϑ)
〉
ϑ
+
1
M
M∑
i=1
(
〈n12〉(ϑi)ℓ(ϑi)−
〈
〈n12〉(ϑ)ℓ(ϑ)
〉
ϑ
)
+
1
M
M∑
i=1
(
n12(ϑi)ℓ(ϑi)− 〈n12〉(ϑi)ℓ(ϑi)
)
= L(η0) + L2(η0, {ϑi}) + L3(η0, {ϑi}, {φit}) (23)
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Figure 3. Loss-distribution per node for the infinite system with ℓ(ϑ) = 1/(ε+pd(ϑ))
at ε = 0.005. Analytic curves are overlaid with simulation results. Lower curve:
non-interacting system, upper curve: interacting system with (J0, J) = (1, 1).
we see that it has three components. The first is simply the expectation value describing
the loss per node at given η0 in an infinite system, the third, L3 has zero mean and is
expected to be Gaussian at large M , with variance scaling as M−1 describing the noise
induced fluctuations about the average for a given collection of {ϑi}, while the second,
L2 — also a a zero mean Gaussian of variance scaling as M
−1 at large M — describes
the finite sample fluctuations of this average. Since the collection of {ϑi} is fixed,
these Gaussians are correlated for different η0. While an analytic evaluation of the loss
distribution may still be feasible in principle, it would become very involved in practice.
An approximation to the finite size computation is obtained by assuming that losses
per node at given η0 are Normally distributed about their infinite system η0-dependent
mean with [combining L2 and L3] variance (also η0-dependent)
σ2M =M
−1
(〈
〈n12〉(ϑ)ℓ2(ϑ)
〉
ϑ
−
〈
〈n12(ϑ)〉ℓ(ϑ)
〉2
ϑ
)
, (24)
which is an annealed approximation which ignores that the parameters of the individual
loss distributions of the nodes in question remain fixed. The results of an evaluation
along this line are shown in Fig 4, using the scaling (20) of average losses used above;
the approximation suggests that finite size fluctuations give rise to fatter tails in the
loss distributions, though the effect is negligible in the interacting system except at the
extreme end of the loss distribution, and small but a bit more pronounced in the non-
interacting system. A comparison with a simulation shows that the effects of fluctuations
are slightly underestimated in our approximation. Note, however, that loan portfolios
of typical banks usually contain orders of magnitude more debtors than the M = 100
considered in the present example.
Let us finally look at the so-called Value at Risk in terms of which the capital buffer
that banks are required to hold to cover risk is often expressed. It is defined as
VaRq = (Qq[L]− 〈L〉) e−rT (25)
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Figure 4. Loss-distribution per node in the large system system limit with ℓ(ϑ) =
1/(ε + pd(ϑ)) at ε = 0.005 and for a finite sample of M = 100 companies randomly
taken from the ensemble. For the finite sample, individual loss distributions are taken
to be flat in the range [0, 2ℓ(ϑ]. Right: The same analytic curves, overlaid with a
simulation result for the finite sample. Lower curves correspond in both cases to the
non-interacting system, upper curves to the interacting system with (J0, J) = (1, 1).
in which Qq[L] is the q-quantile of the loss distribution at time T , i.e. the loss that is
not exceeded with probability q
Prob(L ≤ Qq[L]) = q ,
while 〈L〉 is the average loss, and r denotes a risk free interest rate. To highlight
the effects introduced by economic interactions we take the ratio of the value at risk
computed for economies with and without functional economic interactions VaR/VaR0,
both computed at confidence level q = 0.999 as required by the Basel II regulations [2].
Taking this ratio also eliminates the dependence on the interest rate r.
In Fig 5 we display this ratio alongside with analogous ratios of average losses
〈L〉/〈L〉0 for comparison.
As perhaps may be anticipated in view of results displayed in Figs 3 and 4, the
Value at Risk is significantly more sensitive to functional interactions in an economy,
than the average losses are. This is understandable, as VaR probes the tails of loss
distributions, while average losses will be determined mostly by typical results.
For the results displayed in Fig 5, unconditional default probabilities where not
adjusted with the strength of the interactions so as to keep the average annual default
probability constant. In Fig 6, therefore, we take this extra step, displaying an
analogous ratio of the Value at Risk of interacting and non-interacting economies,
where now unconditional default probabilities in the interacting system are adjusted
in such a way that the average (interaction-renormalized) default probability stays
constant — at the level chosen for the non-interacting system. To keep matters simple,
a homogeneous portfolio, with firm-independent unconditional default probabilities
and firm independent average losses was chosen. Clearly the interaction-induced
enhancement of the Value at Risk is rather close to the corresponding enhancement
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Figure 5. Ratio of Value at Risk for systems with and without functional interaction
as a function of the strength of the interaction (upper curves). The analogous ratio
for average losses is also shown in each case (lower curves). The curves shown in the
three figures are evaluated along straight lines in the J0 − J plane, and the parameter
R measures a distance from the origin R =
√
J2
0
+ J2. The three figure correspond to
the lines J0 = 0 (upper left), J = 0 (upper right) and J0/J = 1 (lower).
computed without adjustment of the unconditional default probabilities.
To summarize, the capital buffer that banks are required to hold according to
the Basel II regulations [2] to cover credit risk is significantly underestimated when
interaction effects in an economy are not taken into account. It is important to note
that this is true already in the regime in which interactions are too weak to cause an
overall acceleration of default rates, as can be seen by comparing the phase diagram
Fig. 2a with results for the Value at Risk displayed in Figs. 5 and 6.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, we have studied the effects of economic interactions on credit risks.
Though non-equilibrium initial conditions and the fact that the credit-risk problem
has an absorbing state would at first sight appear to complicate the analysis, we found,
quite to our own surprise, that in particular the presence of the absorbing state simplifies
the analysis considerably, as it removes the non-Markovian effects in the macroscopic
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Figure 6. Value at Risk relative to Value at Risk in systems without functional
interaction as a function of the strength R =
√
J2
0
+ J2 of the interaction for J0/J = 1,
with unconditional default probabilities in the interacting system adjusted as a function
of the strength R of the interaction to keep the annual average default probability
constant (in the present case at a value close to 3%.). As in Fig. 5, the VaR ratio is
computed at q = 0.999.
dynamics that would otherwise be present in systems with some degree of symmetry in
the interactions. While the limit of extreme dilution simplified the reasoning within the
heuristic solution, we saw in the generating function analysis that the assumption of
extreme dilution could be dispensed with. So although the rather heavy machinery of
non-equilibrium disordered systems theory is required to rigorously treat the model (due
to asymmetry in the inter-firm dependencies and the initial conditions), the resulting
effective single-firm process is remarkably simple. This has obvious practical benefits in
terms of computational efficiency.
We have seen that the effects of economic interactions are relatively weak in typical
economic scenarios, but they are pronounced in situations of economic stress, and thus
lead to a substantial fattening of the tails of loss distributions in large loan portfolios.
This leads to significant increases in the Value at Risk, i.e. the capital that must be
held as a loss buffer, when compared to the non-interacting theory. Importantly, this
conclusion remains valid even in the case where there is no overall acceleration in default
rates, c.f. Fig. 2a and Figs. 5 and 6.
It is worth paraphrasing these last observations as they address a point of key
importance. While credit risk models that do not take direct economic interactions
into account can provide a very reasonable fit, when calibrated on historical data which
reflect normal economic conditions, their predictions would be entirely inadequate when
it comes to estimating default rates and losses in situations of significant economic stress.
Note that the model presented here is suitable for detailed and comprehensive stress
testing, as explicitly demanded within the regulatory framework of the Basel II accord
[2]. The issue of stress testing was addressed in greater detail when the present model
was first introduced in [21].
The patterns of economic interactions studied in the present paper are described
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by an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graph. The large connectivity limit considered in the
present investigation further entails that there is no pronounced heterogeneity in the
sets of economic partners of any one given node. Connectivity distributions other than
Poisson can, however, be handled by suitably adapting the generating function approach
explained in Appendix A along the lines developed in [29], and will be investigated in
a separate publication [33]. In terms of model fitting there appear to be a vast number
of free parameters in terms of the interactions {Jij} between firms. However, it is
important to realise that to understand the macroscopic behaviour, here only their low
order statistics are relevant.
In the present investigation, we restricted ourselves to analysing the effects of
interactions on default-dynamics and, via default rates, on loss distributions. More
subtle effects such as credit-quality migration are, as yet, not taken into account, but
could be modelled along similar lines using the dynamics of interacting multi-state
indicator variables. Further assumptions concerning details of such models would be
required, however, and the full complexity of non-Markovian dynamics would resurface
in such an analysis.
Appendix A. Generating Function Analysis
In this appendix we describe the generating function approach (GFA) to solve our model,
giving full justification to the arguments used in section 3. The reasoning is relatively
standard; we include it here to make the paper reasonably self-contained
Appendix A.1. The Generating Function for Correlation Functions
First we introduce the generating function at fixed value of the macro-economic force
η0,
Z[ψ|η0] =
〈
e−i
∑
12
t=0
∑
i
ψitnit
〉
(A.1)
where the angled brackets denote averages over the microscopic dynamics (2) of ni, i.e.
Z[ψ|η0] =
∑
n0,...,n12
P [n0, . . . ,n12]e
−i
∑12
t=0
∑
i
ψitnit , (A.2)
with P [n0, . . . ,n12] denoting the probability of a sequence of configurations of the entire
set of interacting firms over the risk period of 12 months. The generating function can
be used to compute expectation values and correlation functions via differentiations
with respect to the source fields ψit,
〈nit〉 = i∂Z[ψ|η0]
∂ψit
∣∣∣∣∣
ψ≡0
, 〈nisnjt〉 = i2∂
2Z[ψ|η0]
∂ψis∂ψjt
∣∣∣∣∣
ψ≡0
It is expected that correlation functions averaged over the randomness in the couplings
Jij are dominated by typical realizations of the disorder, hence to describe typical results
an average of the generating function over the disorder,
Z[ψ|η0] =
∫ ∏
i<j
dP (Jij, Jji) Z[ψ|η0] (A.3)
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is computed.
To proceed, the path-probability P [n0, . . . ,n12] at given η0 is expressed in terms of
transition probabilities of the Markovian dynamics,
P [n0, . . . ,n12] = P (n0)
11∏
t=0
P (nt+1|nt) ,
where
P (nt+1|nt) =
∏
i
∫
dξit√
2π
e−
1
2
∑
i
ξ2
itδnit+1,fit (A.4)
with
fit = nit + (1− nit)Θ

∑
j
Jijnjt +
√
1− ρ ξit +√ρ η0 − ϑi

 (A.5)
The ξit integrations appearing in the transition probabilities and the average over the
Jij distribution are facilitated by utilizing δ-distributions to ‘extract’ the ξit and the Jij
from the Heaviside function in fit, using
1 =
∫
duit δ
(
uit −
∑
j
Jijnjt −
√
1− ρ ξit
)
=
∫
duitduˆit
2π
e
−iuˆit
(
uit−
∑
j
Jijnjt−
√
1−ρ ξit
)
.
This gives
P (nt+1|nt) =
∫ ∏
i
duitduˆit
2π
e
∑
i
[
− 1−ρ
2
uˆ2
it
−iuˆit
(
uit−
∑
j
Jijnjt
)]∏
i
δnit+1,fit (A.6)
with now
fit = nit + (1− nit)Θ (uit +√ρ η0 − ϑi) (A.7)
Inserting into the generating function, we get
Z[ψ|η0] =
∑
n0,...,n12
P (n0)
∫ ∏
it
duitduˆit
2π
exp
{∑
it
[
1− ρ
2
(ˆiuit)
2
−iuˆit
(
uit −
∑
j
Jijnjt
)
− iψitnit
]

∏
it
δnit+1,fit
The disorder average affects the Jij; it factorises in the pairs (i, j) and involves the term
∏
(i,j)
Dij =
∏
i<j
exp
{
i
∑
t
(
uˆitJijnjt + uˆjtJjinit
)}c,x
Here the superscripts c and x indicate averages over the cij and the xij in the Jij
according to the statistics (6)-(8). Performing the cij average, one gets
∏
(i,j)
Dij =
∏
i<j

1 + cN
[
exp
{(
J0
c
+
J√
c
xij
)∑
t
iuˆitnjt
+
(
J0
c
+
J√
c
xji
)∑
t
iuˆjtnit
}
− 1
]x

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The exponential is expanded using c ≫ 1. Using (8), keeping dominant terms and
re-exponentiating the result one obtains
∏
(i,j)
Dij ≃ exp

N

J0∑
t
ktmt +
J2
2
∑
s,t
[
Qstqst + αGstGts
]


which depends only on the macro-variables
kt =
1
N
∑
i
iuˆit , mt =
1
N
∑
i
nit (A.8)
Qst =
1
N
∑
i
iuˆisiuˆit , qst =
1
N
∑
i
nisnit , Gst =
1
N
∑
i
iuˆisnit . (A.9)
We thus have
Z[ψ|η0] =
∑
n0,...,n12
P (n0)
∫ ∏
it
duitduˆit
2π
exp
{∑
it
[
1− ρ
2
(ˆiuit)
2 − iuˆituit − iψitnit
]
+N
[
J0
∑
t
ktmt +
J2
2
∑
s,t
[
Qstqst + αGstGts
]]

∏
it
δnit+1,fit
Site factorisation in Z[ψ|η0] is achieved as usual by writing it as an integral over the
macro-variables, using δ-function identities of the form
1 =
∫
d(Nmt) δ
(
Nmt −
∑
j
njt
)
=
∫ dmtdmˆt
2π/N
e
imˆt
(
Nmt−
∑
j
njt
)
and analogous ones for the kt, qst, Qst, and the Gst to compute densities of state. This
results in the following compact expression for the average generating function
Z[ψ|η0] =
∫
D{. . .} exp {N [Φ + Ψ + Ξ]} (A.10)
in which D{. . .} stands for an differentials of all order parameters introduced in (A.8),
(A.9) and their conjugate (hatted) parameters introduced via Fourier-representations of
δ-functions. The functions Φ, Ψ, and Ξ appearing in (A.10) are given by
Φ = J0
∑
t
ktmt +
J2
2
∑
s,t
[
Qstqst + αGstGts
]
(A.11)
Ψ = i
∑
t
[mˆtmt + kˆtkt] + i
∑
st
[qˆstqst + QˆstQst + GˆstGst] (A.12)
Ξ =
1
N
∑
i
log
∑
{nt}
∫ ∏
t
duˆtdut
2π
exp
(
− S − i∑
t
ψitnt
) ∏
t
δnt+1,fit .(A.13)
with S denoting the ‘dynamic action’
S =∑
t
[
−1− ρ
2
(iuˆt)
2+iuˆtut+imˆtnt+ikˆtiuˆt
]
+i
∑
st
[
qˆstnsnt+Qˆstiuˆsiuˆt+Gˆstiuˆsnt
]
(A.14)
The third contribution, Ξ, in (A.10) describes an ensemble of independent single site
dynamical problems. Thus, to leading order in N we have written our generating
function in terms of an integral which may be computed via a saddle point argument.
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Appendix A.2. Saddle Point Problem
In the saddle-point, variation of our observables gives
imˆt = − J0kt ikˆt = −J0mt
iqˆst = − J
2
2
Qst iQˆst = −J
2
2
qst iGˆst = −αJ2Gts (A.15)
mt =
1
N
∑
i
〈nt〉(i) kt = 1
N
∑
i
〈iuˆt〉(i) (A.16)
qst =
1
N
∑
i
〈nsnt〉(i) Qst = 1
N
∑
i
〈iuˆsiuˆt〉(i) (A.17)
Gst =
1
N
∑
i
〈iuˆsnt〉(i) (A.18)
with 〈. . .〉(i) denoting averages evaluated wrt effective single site dynamics at i.
〈. . .〉(i) =
∑
{nt}
∫ ∏
t
duˆtdut
2pi
(. . .) exp
(
− S
)∏
t δnt+1,fit∑
{nt}
∫ ∏
t
duˆtdut
2pi
exp
(
− S
)∏
t δnt+1,fit
(A.19)
In the usual manner [30] averages involving conjugate fields iuˆt describe response
functions, i.e. perturbations of expectation values wrt external fields, so that averages
involving nothing but conjugate variables correspond to perturbations of a constant and
will therefore vanish. Moreover, causality implies that Gst, which describes the response
of the average fraction of defaulted companies to at time t to perturbations at time s
must vanish for s ≥ t. At the saddle point, therefore, we have kt ≡ 0, imˆt ≡ 0, Qst ≡ 0,
iqˆst ≡ 0, and Gst = 0 for s ≥ t, thus iGˆst = 0 for s ≤ t.
With these observations we find that the functions Φ and Ψ appearing in the average
generating function (A.10) are zero at the saddle point,
Φ = 0 , Ψ = 0 , (A.20)
and the dynamic action S of (A.14) simplifies to
S = −1
2
∑
st
[
(1− ρ)δst + J2qst
]
iuˆsiuˆt +
∑
t
iuˆt
(
ut − J0mt − αJ2
∑
s<t
Gstns
)
(A.21)
With this form of the dynamic action the system-dynamics is described by an ensemble
independent effective single-node stochastic process of the form
nt+1 = fϑt ≡ nt + (1− nt)Θ
(
J0mt + αJ
2
∑
s<t
Gstns +
√
ρη0 − ϑ+ φt
)
(A.22)
the details of which are self-consistently specified by macroscopic properties of the
system via the saddle point equations, in that each single site process (i) depends on the
dynamics of the macroscopic fraction of defaulted nodes mt, (ii) the original Gaussian
white noise is replaced by a coloured Gaussian noise φt with correlations depending on
qst
〈φt〉 = 0 , 〈φsφt〉 = (1− ρ)δst + J2qst ,
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and (iii) a memory term appears in the dynamics, if there is some degree of symmetry
in the interactions, i.e. if α 6= 0.
The only site-dependence in the averages 〈. . .〉(i) appearing the fixed point equations
(A.16) - (A.18) comes from the ϑi dependence in the update rules fit. By the law of
large numbers, the sums can therefore be evaluated as an average over the ϑ-distribution
in the large N limit
1
N
∑
i
〈. . .〉(i) −→
∫
dϑp(ϑ)〈. . .〉(ϑ) ≡
〈
〈. . .〉(ϑ)
〉
ϑ
in which 〈. . .〉(ϑ) has the same structure as (A.19), except for the fact that the dynamical
constraints fit of (A.7) are replaced by the fϑt of (A.22). The saddle point equations
thus take the form
mt =
〈
〈nt〉(ϑ)
〉
ϑ
, qst =
〈
〈nsnt〉(ϑ)
〉
ϑ
, Gst =
〈
〈iuˆsnt〉(ϑ)
〉
ϑ
Appendix A.3. Simplification of the Single Node Equation
The single node equation (A.22) is complicated by the fact that it is non-Markovian,
containing a correlation function coupled to the noise term qst and a retarded self-
interaction Gst. This latter term encodes the physics that a firms performance at time
t is influence by its neighbours, themselves dependent on the firm itself at times s < t,
via loops in our network of corporate interactions — in particular short loops arising
through correlated bi-directional interactions. However, as we argued in section 3, if a
firm is bankrupt at time s then the performance of partner firms at time t is irrelevant,
since the firm will still be bankrupt. In the alternative case when the firm is solvent at
time t, it is clear from the definitions in the dynamics that it must have been solvent
at time s < t and thus cannot have affected its partner terms at that time. Thus, the
retarded self-interaction is zero.
There is a second simplifying feature in (A.22) related to the statistics of the
coloured noise within our system. On multiplying (A.22) on both sides by ns with
s < t and and first averaging over the noise φt = (φ1, φ2, . . . , φt) one finds 〈nsnt〉(ϑ) =
〈nmin(s,t)〉(ϑ) at fixed ϑ, since if ns = 1, then nt = 1 due to the absorbing nature of the
defaulted state, whereas if ns = 0, so is the product nsnt, irrespectively of nt. As a
consequence we have qst = mmin(s,t), and thus
〈φsφt〉 = (1− ρ)δst + J2ms , s ≤ t , (A.23)
Having seen that the memory term in the dynamics vanishes, it transpires that only the
equal-time version of the noise correlation 〈φtφt〉 = 1−ρ+J2mt is required to propagate
the order parameter mt. One needs
mt+1 =
〈
〈nt+1〉(ϑ)
〉
ϑ
= mt +
〈〈
(1− nt)Θ(J0mt +√ρη0 − ϑ+ φt)
〉
(ϑ)
〉
ϑ
In order to evaluate the average 〈. . .〉(ϑ) over the correlated noise in the second term,
convert the probability density p(φt) = p(φ1, φ2, . . . , φt) into p(nt, φt) — the joint
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probability density that the node-variable takes value nt (nt = 0 or nt = 1) and the
noise variable at time t is in an infinitesimal interval around φt; formally one can write
this as
p(nt, φt) =
∫
dφt−1p(φt)δnt,nt(ϑ,φt−1) =
∫
dφt−1p(φt−1, φt)δnt,nt(ϑ,φt−1)
where nt(ϑ,φt−1) is the value of nt for the specific ϑ under consideration, and a given
noise history φt−1. Writing the joint probability in terms of a conditional as
p(nt, φt) = p(nt|φt)p(φt) ,
and noting that p(nt|φt) must be independent of the conditioning by causality, and
finally using
p(nt) = 〈nt〉(ϑ)δnt,1 +
(
1− 〈nt〉(ϑ)
)
δnt,0
for a given ϑ one finally obtains
mt+1 =
〈
〈nt+1〉(ϑ)
〉
ϑ
= mt +
〈
1− 〈nt〉(ϑ)
2

1 + erf

J0mt +√ρ η0 − ϑ√
2(1− ρ+ J2mt)



〉
ϑ
(A.24)
which agrees with the result of our heuristic reasoning in Sec 3. Note that the condition
c/N → 0 is not needed in the present argument.
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